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Abstract: The precautionary principal is often invoked when talking about the evidence of
sentience in animals, largely because we can never be certain what any animal is thinking or
feeling. Birch (2017) offers a preliminary framework for the use of the precautionary principal for
animal sentience combining an epistemic rule with a decision rule. I extend this framework by
adding an evolutionary phylogentic approach which spreads the burden of proof across broad
taxonomic groups and a risk assessment component which magnifies the likely impact by the
number of animals involved.
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In the target article, Jonathan Birch (2017) outlines a practical framework for the use of the
precautionary principal when it comes to considering the evidence that an animal is sentient and
the decision to take action when formulating animal protection legislation. The Animal Sentience
Precautionary Principle (ASPP) states that “Where there are threats of serious, negative animal
welfare outcomes, lack of full scientific certainty as to the sentience of the animals in question
shall not be used as the reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent those
outcomes.” His suggested approach is to combine an epistemic rule (BAR) with a corresponding
decision rule (ACT) and provides a practical way to implement ASPP in the context of animal
welfare. The overall framework is reminiscent of risk assessment. The approach is commendable
because it begins to provide a practical framework that practitioners and researchers can use and
refine.
In the past, I have called upon the precautionary principal as it applies to the inclusion of
fish in animal protection legislation (Brown 2016). In doing so, I was not reaching out to the
converted but rather to those who still harbour doubts. I have pointed out, as have many others
(Wadiwel 2016), that there are no absolute truths in the field of animal sentience because we can
never be 100% certain what another animal is feeling or thinking. This applies equally to humans
(Avramides 2001). As far as I’m concerned, the multiple, independent lines of multidisciplinary
evidence supporting pain in bony fish is more than sufficient to include them in our moral circle
(Brown 2015; Sneddon et al. 2015).
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Birch makes an interesting suggestion that we should aim to examine the evidence for
sentience for at least one representative for each order to achieve broad taxonomic coverage.
He also sets a relatively low BAR – just one credible indicator of sentience for any given species.
Personally, I would prefer a higher BAR, perhaps 2 or more independent lines of evidence to
ensure there is little doubt. Assuming we can agree on the appropriate taxonomic level, Birch
provides a decent framework with which one can begin to accumulate evidence. Within teleost
fishes, for example, we are trying to examine more than half the vertebrate diversity on the
planet, which is divided into 37 orders (Betancur-R et al. 2017; www.deepfin.org). Far too few
have been examined to date largely because scientists tend to focus on model organisms (e.g.,
salmononiformes). But by Birch’s definition, there is no doubt that those that have been studied
to date would proceed to stage 2 – ACT – and thus be granted protection (Sneddon 2015).
Table 1. A theoretical risk assessment framework for determining the likely outcome of mistreating fish in
the absence of mitigating actions. Likelihood refers to the scientific evidence that fish are sentient, feel pain
and suffer accordingly. Consequences are the number of individual animals involved.

Likelihood

Consequences
100s (1)
1000s (2)
Almost
Certain (5)
Likely (4)
Possible (3)
Unlikely (2)
Rare (1)
Low

Millions (3)

Billions (4)

Trillions (5)
Catastrophic

High
Moderate

As noted, the framework that Birch presents is reminiscent of risk assessment procedures but he
is missing the Consequences component. For those who are familiar with risk assessment, one
usually generates a risk matrix based on a combination of the likelihood of a risk occurring and
the consequences (Table 1). In this, perhaps more familiar framework, we can set a scene for
animal welfare legislation which has similarities to Birch’s approach. Here the Likelihood of risk
could be determined by various levels of scientific evidence (BAR), and the consequences could
be determined by the number of animals involved. In the case of fish, the evidence is substantial
(Likely or Almost Certain) and the number of animals involved is in the trillions. Thus, the
associated risk category is Catastophic (Table 1). In other words, in the absence of any mitigating
actions (i.e., appropriate animal welfare legislation to protect fish from harm), our current
treatment of fishes has catastrophic consequences for animal welfare. One can easily change the
scale of this approach to the order level; in that case, the corresponding risk category will vary
considerably, since some fish orders are more heavily exploited than others.
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Figure 1. Phylogeny of extant teleost orders (based on www.deepfin.org).

I would add to Birch’s thesis that we can also use the precautionary principal in viewing the
problem through the eyes of an evolutionary biologist. Evolution tends to be highly conservative
when it comes to traits under heavy selective pressure. Sentience and the ability to feel pain are
good examples given the inherent fitness benefits. Closely related taxa tend to share traits
through common decent (shared derived characters). Thus, if we know a trait exists in just a few
orders within a phylogeny, we can use phylogenetic inference to determine its likely distribution
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in the phylogeny as a whole. Take the following example (Figure 1): If we had evidence that
members of the Salmoniformes (e.g., Atlantic salmon) and the Cypriniformes (e.g., zebrafish)
were sentient, then in the absence of any other information, we would conclude that all members
of the Clupeocephala are sentient – that is, the trait is ancestral. The alternative, that the trait
evolved twice independently, is less parsimonious. Thus, we do not necessarily need complete
coverage of clades to be reasonably certain of the distribution of a trait as Birch suggests.
Obviously, the more data we have, the greater the certainty. In the case of teleost fish, placing
our existing knowledge in a phylogenetic framework would lead us to conclude that sentience is
widespread not only in fishes but in all vertebrates.
Another nice example is the distribution of nociceptors in animals, which can be traced
back at least as far as the Annelids. Comparative studies using a wide variety of model organisms
have shown similarities in nociception from invertebrates through to humans (Smith & Lewin
2009). To date, however, studies have failed to identify C-fibres in sharks and rays (Coggeshall et
al. 1978; Leonard 1985; Snow 1993). This lack of evidence has been used as evidence of lack – a
fundamental misinterpretation of scientific method – and has been taken to suggest that sharks
and rays cannot feel pain. But the fact that nociception occurs in jawless fish (agnathans; Mathews
& Wickelgren 1978; Pastor et al. 1996) as well as in bony fish (teleosts; Sneddon 2015) – not to
mention the rest of the vertebrates – suggests the most parsimonious explanation is that sharks
do have these capacities but that we have yet to understand that the receptors or the fibers we
have identified operate in a novel manner. The alternative explanation is that elasmobranchs
have lost the ability of nociception, and one would have to come up with a very convincing
argument for the adaptive value of such a loss in a single taxon in the entire animal kingdom.
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